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Abstract—Many studies have been done to prove the vulnera-
bility of neural networks to adversarial example. A trained and
well-behaved model can be fooled by a visually imperceptible
perturbation, i.e., an originally correctly classified image could be
misclassified after a slight perturbation. In this paper, we propose
a black-box strategy to attack such networks using an evolution
algorithm. First, we formalize the generation of an adversarial
example into the optimization problem of perturbations that
represent the noise added to an original image at each pixel.
To solve this optimization problem in a black-box way, we find
that an evolution algorithm perfectly meets our requirement
since it can work without any gradient information. Therefore,
we test various evolution algorithms, including a simple genetic
algorithm, a parameter-exploring policy gradient, an OpenAI
evolution strategy, and a covariance matrix adaptive evolution
strategy. Experimental results show that a covariance matrix
adaptive evolution Strategy performs best in this optimization
problem. Additionally, we also perform several experiments to
explore the effect of different regularizations on improving the
quality of an adversarial example.
Index Terms—Neural Networks, Adversarial Example, Evolu-
tion Algorithm
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, deep convolutional neural networks (DCNNs)
have become the state-of-art learning model in the computer
vision field. Since AlexNet [1] won the ImageNet Large
Scale Visual Recognition Competition (ILSVRC) in 2012,
an increasing number of researchers have been attracted to
DCNNs due to their powerful abilities of learning and feature
extraction. Up to now, almost every advanced solution for
image problems are based on DCNNs, such as image classifi-
cation, target detection [2] [3], semantic segmentation [4] [5],
and pose estimation [6]. With the development of computer
vision technology, many intelligent applications have emerged,
e.g., face recognition for identity authentication and visual
perception for intelligent vehicles. Therefore, the security
of these intelligent systems has become increasingly more
important.
Although DCNNs have shown impressive results in such
fields, more attention must be paid to their weaknesses,
namely, that they do not constitute a robust model and are
vulnerable to adversarial example attacks [7]. For basic image
classification problems in computer vision, assuming a trained
classifier exists, the purpose of such attacks is to find the
perturbations that can make the input image able to fool the
classifier. After being perturbed, the image that is originally
correctly classified will be misclassified by the classifier. The
Fig. 1. Adversarial example generated by evolution attack. Left, original clean
image; right, adversarial example for different misclassification targets.
perturbed image is called an adversarial example. In addition,
the perturbations must be as small as possible; otherwise, the
abnormal image can be easily found and rejected manually.
The issue in generating a qualified, quality adversarial
example is to find the perturbations that meet the following
requirements:
• Perturbations that lead to the misclassification of an
image that is correctly classified.
• Perturbations need to be as unperceptive to people as
much as possible.
Based on access right to model gradient information, two
kinds of attacks exist: white-box attacks and black-box attacks.
A white-box attack is one in which attackers need to
know detailed information about the target DCNN model.
For example, the efficient attack algorithms fast gradient sign
(FGS) [8] and fast gradient value (FGV) [9] require that the
gradient information of classifier output for every input pixel
element be known. It is implied that these methods will not
work without knowledge of the internal architecture of the
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classifier. Considering an actual situation, it is difficult for an
attacker to know such information, so the black-box attack
method is much more dangerous than the white-box attack
method.
In contrast to a white-box attack, the basic and important
requirement for a black-box attack is to generate an adversarial
example without detailed information of the classifier system.
The only knowledge required is the output vector of the
classifier.
To attack a target model without gradient information, we
find that the intelligent optimization method called an evolu-
tion algorithm (EA) [21], whose primary characteristic, i.e.,
no demand for gradient information, perfectly meets the re-
quirements of a black-box attack if the problem of adversarial
example generation can be transformed into the optimization
problem of perturbation. EAs comprise another large field of
study, compared to numerical analysis optimization methods
like gradient descent and the Newton method, and are closer
to space searching. To solve the above optimization problem,
we propose an advanced EA named the covariance matrix
adaptation evolution strategy (CMA-ES) [20] [22] [23]. In
addition, we test other EAs for comparison, such as a simple
genetic algorithms (GA) [16], a parameter-exploring policy
gradient (PEPG) [17] [18], and the OpenAI evolution strategy
(OpenAI ES) [19]. To improve the quality of adversarial
examples, we also performed several experiments to explore
the effects using different regularizations.
The main work presented in this paper comprises the
following:
• Formalizing the process of generating an adversarial
example.
• Successfully generating the adversarial example by our
black-box attack strategy. As the most indispensable part,
the efficiency of the EA directly determines the quality
of the adversarial example. Therefore, we test different
EAs, such as a GA, PEPG, OpenAI ES, and CMA-ES in
our strategy.
• Considering that our method can generate an adversarial
example of 100%, the quality, i.e., the similarity between
the original and perturbed images, is the most valuable
evaluation index for our attack method. Thus, we evaluate
the adversarial examples generated by different EAs.
In addition, we also try different regularizations of our
optimization target to reduce the perturbations.
II. RELATED WORK
Although DCNNs have been proven to be a powerful
learning model, Szegedy et al. [7] first found that a hardly
perceptible perturbation would lead to misclassification of
the trained Network. Goodfellow et al. [8] applied the FGS
algorithm to generate an adversarial example and explained
that the linear nature of DCNNs was responsible for its
vulnerability:
η = sign(∇xJ(θ,x, y)). (1)
Rozsa et al. [9] improved the FGS and proposed the FGV
algorithm:
η = (∇xJ(θ,x, y)). (2)
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [10] suggested an iteration method
named DeepFool to minimize the perturbation η, which is
sufficient to change the predicted result. The existence of
universal perturbations was shown in [12]. Baluja et al. [14]
proposed the adversarial transformation network, which is
similar to an autoencoder, to generate an adversarial example.
Xie et al. [13] developed an adversarial example for semantic
segmentation and object detection.
The above works all concern a white-box attack. Consider-
ing a black-box attack is more dangerous in the real world,
Papernot et al. [11] proposed the black-box attack strategy,
in which the substitute model needs to be trained using the
outputs of the original model as labels. Thus, an adversarial
example based on detailed information of the new substitute
model can also fool the original model.
For adversarial defense, Goodfellow et al. [8] found that
adversarial training could reduce network overfitting and, in
turn, reinforce the robustness. Papernot et al. [15] applied
defensive distillation to improve the robustness of the network.
Lee et al. [24] tried to use a generative adversarial network
(GAN) to train a robust classifier. Its generator is supposed to
generate perturbations and its classifier is supposed to correctly
classify both the original and perturbed images.
III. CMA-ES
Below, we introduce the CMA-ES, which, as one of the
most advanced EAs, plays the most significant role in the
black-box attack method proposed in this paper.
Before the official introduction of CMA-ES, we briefly
discuss the basic characteristics and history of EAs. Different
from the numerical analysis optimization methods, such as
the gradient descent or Newton methods, an EA requires
fewer assumptions and can work without the gradient informa-
tion. Therefore, it can be seen as the black-box optimization
method.
In the beginning, EA was developed from the central idea
of Darwin’s theory of evolution, i.e., survival of the fittest.
Assuming there are large numbers of populations, after natural
selection, the survival populations, called elite populations,
recombine with each other to generate the new generation of
populations that are supposed to have better survival ability
then the previous generation. In an EA, the survival ability
can be described as a fitness function, i.e., one that is equal
to the loss function in an optimization problem. The above
introduction can be seen as the basic EA process. With the
passage of time, increasingly more innovations have occurred
in EAs, including various methods of population generation,
selection, and recombination.
Simple EAs behave well in low-dimensional optimization
problems, but nevertheless show poor ability when facing
high-dimensional optimization problems. Compared to gradi-
ent descent, an EA is more like the space searching method,
Fig. 2. Ellipsoids depicting one-σ lines of equal density of six different normal distributions. Left:N (0, σI). Middle: N (0,D2). Right:N (0,C). D is a
diagonal matrix. C is a positive-definite covariance matrix
which means it must face the ”dimension explosion” problem
with the increase in problem dimensionality.
We submit that CMA-ES can improve the optimization
efficiency to some extent. Compared to other EAs, the largest
difference in CMA-ES is that it introduces a priori knowledge
of problem distribution. Unlike GA and other simple EAs
that treat different dimensions independently, CMA-ES regards
the optimization problem as a multivariate normal distribution
defined by the mean vector and covariance matrix. Every gen-
eration of populations is sampled from the current multivariate
normal distribution, further, selection and recombination are
designed to update the mean vector and covariance matrix to
make the distribution closer to the local optimal point. The
multivariate normal distribution N (m,C) is written in (3):
N (m,C) ∼m+N (0,C)
∼m+C1/2N (0, I)
∼m+BDBTN (0, I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∼N (0,I)
∼m+BDN (0, I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∼N (0,D2)
.
(3)
The covariance matrix C ∈ Rn∗n is symmetric and positive
definite, so C = BD2BT is the eigen-decomposition of C,
and then C1/2 = BDBT.
N (0, I) produces a spherical(isotropic) distribution, as in
the left-hand panel of Fig. III. D scales the spherical dis-
tribution within the coordinate axes as in the middle panel
of Fig. III. DN (0, I) ∼ N (0,D2) has n independent com-
ponents. The matrix D can be interpreted as an individual
step-size matrix and its diagonal entries are the standard
deviations of the components. B defines a new orientation
for the ellipsoid, where the new principal axes of the ellipsoid
correspond to the columns of B.
The transformation in (3) helps sample the population from
the current distribution in a computer considering that N (0, I)
actually represents the independent normal distribution in
every dimension.
Every element in the covariance matrix is the covariance
between every two dimensions. Considering the real complex
optimization problem is always highly coupled in different
dimensions, and the covariance matrix can represent such a
complex relationship in some ways if the iteration update is
effective. The effective measure of the update will increase
the variance along the efficient searching directions. In fact,
thinking about the coordinate transformation of a vector in a
new coordinate system in principal component analysis (PCA),
the main directions represented in the covariance matrix are
equivalent to the base vector in the new coordinate system.
The main selection and recombination formed in the CMA-
ES include two kinds of methods to adapt the covariance
matrix and one kind of method to update the mean vector
after selection.
A. Rank-1 Update
Roughly speaking, a rank-1 update is a historical accumu-
lation of the trajectory of the elite populations’ mean vector
m ∈ Rn. Thus, CMA-ES defines the evolution path to record
the trajectory of m. In fact, pc is the weighted average of
m(g+1)−m(g)
σ in every iteration:
p(g+1)c = (1− cc)p(g)c +
√
cc(2− cc)m
(g+1) −m(g)
σ(g)
. (4)
p
(g)
c ∈ Rn is the evolution path at generation g and cc ≤ 1
the balance coefficient for historical accumulation and current
generation.
The rank-1 update for the covariance matrix is expressed as
C(g+1) = (1− c1)C(g) + c1p(g+1)c p(g+1)
T
c . (5)
B. Rank-µ-Update
The rank-µ update plays an important role when population
size increases. It is actually the weighted maximum-likelihood
estimation for the covariance matrix C:
Fig. 3. Explanation for CMA-ES evolution process, which is designed to find the minimum point of (x1−2)2+(x2−1.5)2. Left: Sampling the populations
from the current multivariate normal distribution. Middle: Selecting the elite populations and updating the covariance matrix. Right: Moving the mean vector.
C(g+1) = (1− cµ)C(g) + cµ 1
σ(g)2
= (1− cµ)C(g) + cµ
µ∑
i=1
wiy
(g+1)
i:λ y
(g+1)T
i:λ .
(6)
where cµ is the learning rate for updating the covariance
matrix, w1,...,µ ∈ R,
∑
i wi = 1 and w1 ≥ . . . ≥ wµ ≥ 0,
y
(g+1)
i:λ = (x
(g+1)
i:λ −m(g))/σ(g)
C. Mean Vector Update
The mean vector update is expressed as
m(g+1) =m(g) + cm
µ∑
i=1
wi(x
(g+1)
i:λ ). (7)
where cm is the learning rate for updating the mean vector.
Algorithm 1 CMA-ES
Input: Optimization Objective (Fitness Function) L() ∈ R,
CMA-ES Hyper-parameter (Learning Step σ, population
size λ, Elite-Population size µ, Initial Multivariate Normal
Distribution (Covariance Matrix C, Mean Vector m ∈
Rn))
Output: Local Optimal Point p ∈ Rn
1: while do not meet terminal conditions do
2: Sampling Populations from current Multivariate Nor-
mal Distribution
3: Calculate the Fitness Value for Population
4: Select the Elite-Populations according to Fitness Value
5: Recombine and update the Multivariate Normal Dis-
tribution (Rank-1 Update,Rank-µ Update, Mean Vector
Update)
6: end while
7: return Local Optimal Point p ∈ Rn
We only introduce the above basic concept of CMA-ES in
this paper considering that CMA-ES is a complicated subject.
It is a necessary part of our black-box attack strategy as it
can optimize without gradient information. Further, CMA-ES
also involves the control of the learning-step size. The detailed
analysis of CMA-ES can be found in [20].
IV. BLACK-BOX ATTACK STRATEGY
Here, we introduce our black-box attack strategy.
To a classifier, the process of attack can be seen as the gen-
eration of an adversarial example. A black-box strategy means
we must attack without any internal architecture information
about the target model. The only accessible information about
the target model is its output vector. The aim of attack is to
find the perturbations that would lead to the misclassification
of the target model. Furthermore, we can choose the attack
target, i.e., the desired classification result after the input
image is perturbed, and our strategy is able to manipulate the
misclassification result on any class desired.
First, we must determine the attack target and the one-
hot vector that could represent the attack target. Then, the
formalization must be done to set the optimization problem of
the perturbation.
The training step for the neural network can serve as a
comparison for such an optimization problem.The supervised
learning for the neural network will find the suitable network
weight to minimize the loss function (like cross-entropy) at a
given input and corresponding label as it is described in the
following equation:
argmin
W
D(Y ,F (X,W )), (8)
where X is the input image, W are the weights of the
neural network, Y ∈ Rn corresponds to the one hot label
vector for input X , F () ∈ Rn is the classifier function, i.e.,
network, D() ∈ R is the loss function for supervised learning,
e.g., cross-entropy.
For an adversarial attack, the network is trained, suggesting
that W is fixed and the parameters that must be optimized
are the perturbations η. If we set the adversarial label Y ′,
which represents the attack target for the corresponding input
X , the minimization process will finally find the perturbation
that enables the input image X to fool the classifier:
argmin
η
D(Y ′,F (X + η,W )) + β ‖ η ‖, (9)
where η ∈ Rw∗h∗c is the noise of the original input image
and ‖ . ‖ is the norm of the tensor, e.g., L2, L∞. To limit the
perturbations, β is the balance coefficient in multi-objective
optimization.
We have thus set the optimization objective. The next step is
to use the EA to solve this problem. Additionally, we need to
set the terminal conditions for evolution iteration, as expressed
in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Evolution Attack
Input: Trained Network F () ∈ Rn, Input image X ∈
Rw∗h∗c, Attack Target t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} and
t 6=correct class, Fitness FunctionD() ∈ R(like cross-
entropy), CMA-ES Hyper-parameter (Learning Step σ,
population size λ, Elite-Population size µ, Initial Multi-
variate Normal Distribution (Covariance Matrix C, Mean
Vector m ∈ Rn))
Output: Adversarial Example (Perturbed Image)
1: Using One Hot encoding to set the Adversarial Target
Vector Y ′ ∈ Rn based on Attack Target t
2: Acquire the current classification result cls =
argmaxF (X)
3: while cls 6= t do
4: Sampling Perturbation η ∈ Rw∗h∗c from the current
Multivariate Normal Distribution as the population P =
{η0,η1, ,ηλ−1}
5: Predict the Perturbed Images Yˆi = F (X + ηi)(i ∈
{0, 1, . . . , λ − 1}) and calculate the Fitness Values
D(Yˆi,Y
′) respectively.
6: Select the Elite-Populations and Recombination to
update the Multivariate Normal Distribution
7: cls = argmaxF (X+η0) (η0 is the best perturbation
base on Fitness Value)
8: end while
9: return Adversarial Example=(X + η0)
V. EXPERIMENT
To test our black-box attack strategy, we require a trained
network, and we therefore trained two classifiers that meet
the baseline criteria: 1) LeNet on MNIST, which can achieve
98.9% accuracy on the test set, and 2) simple ResNet−18 on
Cifar−10, which can achieve 90.1% accuracy on the test set.
The architectures of these networks are described in Tables I
and II, respectively.
In the MNIST experiment, we tested different EAs, in-
cluding a simple GA, PEPG, OpenAI ES, and CMA-ES. We
also tested different population sizes, i.e., 25 and 100. The
elite populations ratio was set to 50%, initial mean vector
to 0w∗h∗c, and learning step size to 0.05. For an adversarial
TABLE I
LENET ARCHITECTURE
Layer Type Parameter Padding Activation
Conv Kernel:3x3 20, Stride=1 SAME ReLu
MaxPool 2x2
Conv Kernel:3x3 20, Stride=1 SAME ReLu
MaxPool 2x2
Flatten
FC 500 (Number of neurons) ReLu
FC 10 (Number of neurons) SoftMax
TABLE II
RESNET-18 ARCHITECTURE
Layer Type Parameter Padding Activation
Conv Kernel:3x3 64, Stride=1 SAME ReLu
Residual Block Kernel:3x3 64, Stride=1 SAME ReLu
Residual Block Kernel:3x3 128, Stride=1 SAME ReLu
MaxPool 2x2
Residual Block Kernel:3x3 256, Stride=2 SAME ReLu
Residual Block Kernel:3x3 512, Stride=1 SAME ReLu
MaxPool 2x2
Conv Kernel:3x3 512, Stride=1 SAME ReLu
Flatten
FC 10 (Number of neurons) SoftMax
target, we chose the second-most likely class predicted by
the classifier as the original input image. In this case, the
evolution iteration would keep attacking until the desired
misclassification occurred. For regularization in (9), we set
β as 1.
These terminal conditions ensure that our attack method
could generate an adversarial example in 100% of the cases.
In other words, the quality of the adversarial example is the
most important issue for evaluating the strategy. We define the
quality of the adversarial example as the similarity between
the original image and adversarial example. We therefore
measured the L1Norm, L2Norm, and L∞Norm of pertur-
bations. Additionally, we used the structural similarity index
(SSIM) to evaluate the two images’ similarity.
As a realization of the structural similarity theory, the SSIM
defines the structural information from the perspective of
image composition independent of brightness and contrast,
reflecting the properties of the object structure in the scene.
The mean is used as the estimate of the brightness, the standard
deviation as the estimate of the contrast, and the covariance as
a measure of the degree of structural similarity. To a certain
extent, the SSIM can reflect the difference between the original
and perturbed images in human visual perception. SSIM values
range from 0 to 1, where 1 means that two images are exactly
the same.
From Table. III, it can be seen that a simple GA, PEPG, and
OpenAI-ES improve their optimization effect with increased
population size. However, CMA-ES performed better in pop-
ulation sizes of 25 than in population sizes of 100 without
any regularization. We think the reason for this phenomenon
is the recombination method in the algorithm. For simple
optimization problems, the increase of population size leads to
TABLE III
MNIST EXPERIMENT: PERFORMANCE OF DIFFERENT EAS IN
ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
Similarity Evaluation
EA L1Norm L2Norm L∞Norm SSIM
GA(25) 34.5883 1.9533 0.3006 0.8037
GA(100) 32.0961 1.7931 0.2671 0.8151
PEPG(25) 38.0039 2.1237 0.2875 0.7914
PEPG(100) 32.4222 1.7693 0.2122 0.8164
OpenAI(25) 35.1598 1.9473 0.2523 0.8034
OpenAI(100) 30.8387 1.6566 0.1841 0.8251
CMA-ES(25) 25.4210 1.4649 0.2556 0.8470
CMA-ES(100) 32.2897 1.8284 0.3024 0.8117
TABLE IV
MNIST EXPERIMENT: PERFORMANCE OF DIFFERENT REGULARIZATIONS
ON ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
Similarity Evaluation
EA L1Norm L2Norm L∞Norm SSIM
CMA-ES(25) 25.4210 1.4649 0.2556 0.8470
CMA-ES(25)−L2 24.2534 1.4062 0.2486 0.8531
CMA-ES(25)−L∞ 25.5840 1.4610 0.2159 0.8497
CMA-ES(100) 32.2897 1.8284 0.3024 0.8117
CMA-ES(100)−L2 31.4301 1.7800 0.2964 0.8153
CMA-ES(100)−L∞ 25.8740 1.4766 0.2315 0.8484
an increase in the number of elite populations, which brings
some noise to the distribution update. Since images in MNIST
have 28*28*1 pixels and images in Cifar−10 have 32*32*3
pixels, it is not suitable to compare the L1Norm and L2Norm
of the different datasets. We only observe the performance of
different population sizes in the same dataset. In Table. V, for
the Cifar−10 experiment, it can be seen that, for large pop-
ulation sizes, CMA-ES performs better. Owing to the larger
number of dimensions in optimization, the opposite result is
shown for the MNIST experiment. Therefore, one cannot just
say which population size is better, but performance is deter-
mined by the actual situation. For low-dimensional problems,
large population size does not guarantee better performance.
For high-dimensional problems, the optimization result may
be improved because of more populations. The quantitative
relationship between dimension and population size merits
more attention. Further, another factor is the weighted method
of elite populations. A smoother weighted method means more
global searching, in other words, the approach may not be
efficient enough. In our attack method, the more efficient
optimization method means a higher-quality adversarial image.
Thus, more time is still needed to explore how to improve the
optimization method in such situations.
Another issue worth discussing is regularization. From
Table. IV, it can be seen that additional regularization indeed
improves the performances of our attack method. The opti-
mization difficulty increases with added regularization, and
turns out to be the multi-objective optimization problem. In
such situations, we think a large-populations-size CMA-ES
could work better. Experimental results show that a large-
population-size CMA-ES exhibits more obviously improved
TABLE V
CIFAR-10 EXPERIMENT: DIFFERENT REGULARIZATIONS ON
ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
Similarity Evaluation
EA L1Norm L2Norm L∞Norm SSIM
CMA-ES(25) 150.8968 3.4296 0.2329 0.7908
CMA-ES(25)−L2 150.2518 3.4152 0.2313 0.7921
CMA-ES(25)−L∞ 150.6225 3.4229 0.2295 0.7915
CMA-ES(100) 124.5613 2.8314 0.1925 0.8370
CMA-ES(100)−L2 123.9939 2.8182 0.1908 0.8384
CMA-ES(100)−L∞ 124.5772 2.8310 0.1884 0.8474
performance, while a small-population-size CMA-ES still
shows better problem-solving ability. In Table. V, for the
Cifar−10 experiment, the benefits from different regulariza-
tions are not obvious enough to say which regularization is
better. We regard the SSIM as the most important index in
our evaluation. Our thinking is, if large population size can
bring a more direct searching direction in the multi-objective
optimization problem, then the L∞Norm may be the better
choice to limit perturbations, because in both the MNIST and
Cifar−10 experiments, L∞Norm helps more than L2Norm
in large-population-size CMA-ES. However, we are not very
confident in this conclusion, and more detailed experiments
should be conducted to vet this idea.
The hyper-parameter of CMA-ES, as the most indispensable
and important part of our evolution attack method, will directly
influence the quality of an adversarial attack. As with the
evolution algorithm, it is impossible to say which hyper-
parameter is definitely the best. However, our experiment
fortunately shows that it is perfectly suitable for our evolution
attack.
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